TC 

774 

H363d 


HEILPRIN 

DEENSE  OF 
PANAIV1A  ROUTE 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


A  "DEFENSE 


OF  THE 


PANAMA  ROUTED 


BY 


PROF.  ANGELO  ^EILPRIN,  F.  R.  G.  S., 

Vice-President  of  the  Geographical  Society  of  Philadelphia;  Member  of  the 

American  Philosophical  Society,  of  the  Board  of  Managers  of  the 

National  Geographic  Society  of  Washington,  of  the 

Geological  Society  of  America,  etc. 


Printed  for  the  Author. 

THE  FRANKLIN   PRESS. 

Philadelphia,  March,  1902. 


.' 


A  DEFENSE  OF  THE  PANAMA  ROUTE. 


BY 
PROF.  ANGELO  HEILPRIN,  F.  R.  G.  S., 

Vice-President  of  the  Geographical  Society  of  Philadelphia;  Member  of  the 

American  Philosophical  Society,  of  the  Board  of  Managers  of  the 

National  Geographic  Society  of  Washington,  of  the 

Geological  Society  of  America,  etc. 


The  final  report  (Senate  Document  No.  54,  1901)  of  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  so  manifestly  sets  forth  the  engi- 
neering advantages  of  the  Panama  Canal  route,  while  giving 
a  decision  in  favor  of  the  Nicaragua  route,  that  it  is  no  longer 
necessary  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  of  this  phase  of  the  canal 
problem.  Aside,  however,  from  conceding  what  had  been 
very  generally  known  to  engineers  before  the  Commission 
came  into  existence,  and  furnishing  a  valuable  summary  of 
the  work  made  in  the  field  by  its  special  experts  (the  details 
of  which  are  published  elsewhere),  the  report  is  singularly 
defective  in  some  of  its  particulars,  and  will  be  judged  by 
many  to  emphasize  largely,  or  even  wholly,  erroneous  con- 
clusions. These  conclusions  touch  not  so  much  important 
questions  in  engineering  as  they  do  those  of  geography  (com- 
merce) and  geology. 

THE   SHORT   COMMERCIAL   ROUTE. 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  report  says:  "For  the  com- 
merce in  which  the  United  States  is  most  interested,  that 
between  our  Pacific  ports  and  Atlantic  ports,  European  and 
American,  the  Nicaragua  route  is  shorter  by  about  one  day, 

i 


2  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

The  same  advantage  exists  between  our  Atlantic  ports  and 
the  Orient"  (p.  260).  While  it  may  be  easily  denied,  in  view 
of  the  rapid  development  of  trade  with  South  America  and 
the  fact  that  the  transcontinental  railroad  lines  will  always  be 
competitors  in  freight  carriage  to  and  from  the  vast  interior 
of  the  national  domain,  that  the  canal  commerce  in  which  the 
United  States  is  most  interested  is  that  which  links  the 
eastern  and  western  ports  of  our  own  country,  the  error  of 
the  conclusion  that  for  this  commerce  the  Nicaragua  route 
is  shorter  by  about  one  day  cannot  be  questioned.  The 
Commission  affirms  that  the  estimated  time  for  a  deep-draft 
vessel  to  pass  over  the  contemplated  Panama  route  is  12 
hours,  and  over  the  Nicaragua  route — the  longer  by  134.57 
miles — 33  hours,  giving  the  advantage  of  21  hours  to  the 
Panama  route.  Applying  this  advantage  to  steamers  of  dif- 
ferent sailing  powers,  to  those  of  13  knots,  15  knots,  and  20 
knots  (cruisers),  we  obtain  as  profit  to  the  vessels  using  the 
Panama  route  139,  181,  and  286  knots  respectively.  The 
U.  S.  Hydrographic  Office  furnishes  the  data  regarding  the 
different  sailing  routes,  and  gives  an  actual  saving  in  distance 
(between  New  York  and  San  Francisco)  by  the  use  of  the 
Nicaragua  route  of  377  miles.  Therefore,  the  net  gain  by 
the  Nicaragua  traverse  would  be  this  amount  less  the  loss 
in  making  the  long  isthmian  journey:  238  miles  (or  18.3 
hours)  for  the  I3~knot  steamers;  196  miles  (or  13  hours)  for 
the  15-knot  steamers,  and  91  miles  (or  4.5  hours)  for  the  20- 
knot  cruisers.  A  consideration  of  a  lo-knot  speed,  which 
appears  to  underlie  the  result  obtained  by  the  Commission, 
may  be  interesting,  but  is  hardly  of  value  in  the  determination 
of  canal  construction,  since  it  is  certain,  with  the  rapid  devel- 
opment of  speed-power,  that  but  few  vessels  entering  as  com- 


A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route.  3 

petitors  for  freight  in  an  extended  ocean  course  will  in  the 
future  be  constructed  with  a  speed-power  of  less  than  14  or 
15  knots. 

The  conditions  in  regard  to  the  course  to  the  Orient 
are  still  more  favorable  to  the  Panama  route,  for  the  saving  in 
actual  distance  via  Nicaragua,  as  the  data  of  the  Hydro- 
graphic  Office  show,  is  only  255  miles.  Therefore,  steamers 
of  13  knots  using  the  Nicaragua  route  would  have  the  advan- 
tage over  the  Panama  steamers  of  only  9  hours  (116  miles)  in 
the  course  to  Yokohama  and  Shanghai ;  and  those  of  15  knots, 
of  only  5  hours  (74  miles).  The  swift-flying  cruiser  of  20 
knots  would,  on  the  other  hand,  lose  i£  hours  (31  miles).  In 
the  course  to  Australia  the  advantage  would  lie  with  the 
Panama  route.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  these  slight  differ- 
ences of  disadvantage  or  advantage,  over  courses  of  5,000  and 
10,000  miles  length,  practically  parallel  the  two  routes.  The 
conditions  are,  however,  wholly  different  when  the  course 
with  the  western  ports  of  South  America  is  considered,  and 
concerning  which  the  Commission  reports :  "For  commerce 
between  North  Atlantic  ports  and  the  west  coast  of  South 
America  the  Panama  route  is  shorter  by  about  two  days" 
(p.  261) — a  saving  of  two  days  in  a  traverse  (to  Guayaquil)  of 
only  2,900  miles! 

In  this  determination  of  travel-time  the  figures  given  by 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  for  the  traverse  of  the  two 
routes  have  been  accepted  merely  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
senting the  problem  in  the  most  favorable  aspect  taken  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  Commission.  It  is,  however,  positively 
certain  that  if  the  average  passage  over  the  Panama  route  is 
to  be  taken  at  12  hours,  no  vessel  would  or  could  make  the 
average  Nicaragua  passage — longer  by  134  miles,  with  a  con- 


4  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

siderably  higher  summit  level,  and  through  a  canal  with  twice 
the  number  of  locks  with  much  more  rapid  curves — in  33 
hours.  It  is  not  alone  the  question  of  actual  sailing  time, 
but  that  of  delays,  which  has  to  be  taken  into  account  into  the 
resolution  of  traverse-time ;  and  it  is  needless  to  say  that  over 
a  long  canal  course  the  possibilities  (certainties)  of  delays  of 
different  kinds  are  accentuated  in  a  very  different  degree  from 
what  they  would  be  over  a  short  canal  course.  It  can  reason- 
ably be  accepted  that  40  hours  would  more  nearly  represent 
the  actual  traverse  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  than  33  hours. 
With  this  time  allowance  the  Panama  Canal  would  be  made 
the  virtual  equal  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  even  in  the  trade 
route  between  our  Atlantic  ports  and  the  Pacific  ports  of  the 
United  States,  for  a  15-knot  steamer  traversing  it  would  only 
lag  77  miles  (5.1  hours)  of  its  Nicaraguan  competitor  in  the 
voyage  to  San  Francicso,  while  a  2O-knot  cruiser  would  be 
in  advance  by  63  miles  (3.1  hours). 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  with  practically  no  saving 
advantage  to  either  route  in  the  course  to  the  western  coast 
of  the  United  States  and  the  ports  of  the  Orient,  and  with  a 
most  marked  advantage  to  the  Panama  route  in  the  course  to 
the  western  coast  of  South  America,  the  true  commercial 
isthmian  route  is  that  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

THE    DANGER   FROM    VOLCANIC    DISTURBANCES. 

In  its  Preliminary  Report,  submitted  to  Congress  in 
December,  1900,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  is  silent  on 
the  subject  of  the  dangers  from  earthquake  and  volcanic  dis- 
turbances to  which  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  would  be  subject, 
manifestly  considering  as  satisfactory  the  report  of  the  Geolo- 
gist of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission  (whose  labors  prac- 


A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route.  5 

tically  excluded  this  field  of  inquiry)  confirming  the  report 
of  the  earlier  geologist  employed  by  the  Maritime  Canal 
Company  that  the  risk  of  serious  injury  was  "so  small  that 
it  ought  to  be  neglected  alike  by  the  Maritime  Canal  Com- 
pany, the  Construction  Company,  and  by  contemplating  in- 
vestors." It  is  probably  on  the  strength  of  this  opinion  that 
the  Nicaragua  Canal  Construction  Company,  in  their  bro- 
chure on  "The  Inter-Oceanic  Canal  of  Nicaragua"  (1891), 
exultingly  refers  to  the  "grand  old"  cathedral  of  Leon  as 
having  "for  more  than  a  century  and  a  half  .  .  .  stood  the 
vicissitudes  of  earthquake,  weather,  war,  piracy,  revolution, 
and  its  walls  are  still  solid  and  unshaken,"  and  define  the  risk 
of  injury  to  Nicaragua  Canal  construction  by  earthquakes 
as  existing  only  "in  the  theories  of  those  who  are  interested 
in  the  making  a  canal  at  some  other  locality  or  in  the  mind 
of  the  man  who  is  naturally  a  pessimist  and  opposed  to  all 
bold  undertakings."  This  vain-glorying  was,  however,  re- 
buked in  less  than  a  decade,  for,  on  April  29,  1898,  a  violent 
earthquake,  which  agitated  the  whole  of  Nicaragua,  and  had 
its  greatest  intensity  in  the  plain  of  Leon,  destroyed  (as  we 
are  informed  in  the  report  of  the  Government  Technical 
Commission  of  Nicaragua)  340  houses  in  the  city  of  Leon, 
besides  inflicting  considerable  damage  elsewhere.  Even  the 
"grand  old"  cathedral  had  its  walls  and  cupolas  rent  with 
cracks. 

In  its  present  final  report,  the  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
mission finds  it  necessary  to  enter  into  a  brief  discussion  of 
this  subject,  which,  indeed,  might  be  considered  to  be  rather 
an  apology  for  a  discussion  than  a  discussion  itself.  Little 
sympathy  can  be  had  for  a  report  which  dismisses  this  all- 
important  topic  in  hardly  more  than  three  pages,  and  uses  as 


6  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

its  main  argumentative  text  Humboldt's  Cosmos,  the  first 
American  edition  of  Lyell's  Principles  of  Geology,  the 
second  edition  of  Daubeny's  Volcanoes,  and  the  frag- 
mentary (and  confessedly  incomplete)  list  of  earthquakes 
prepared  by  Montessus  de  Ballore.  The  sciences  of  vulcan- 
ology  and  seismology  have  made  such  rapid  advances  during 
the  last  quarter  of  a  century  that  one  wonders  how  reference 
can  be  made  to  these  works  for  "authority" ;  nor  is  it  more 
intelligible  how  Humboldt's  earliest  conception  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  mountain  systems  of  the  two  continents,  which 
Humboldt  himself  quite  gave  up  upwards  of  forty  years  ago, 
can  be  taken  as  the  modern  guide  in  the  study  of  the  region 
in  question.  We  are  told  that  a  glance  at  the  map  appended 
to  the  report  will  show  "that  the  entire  isthmus  between 
North  and  South  America  is  a  volcanic  region,"  and,  follow- 
ing Humboldt,  that  "the  grandest  example  of  a  continental 
volcanic  'chain'  is  offered  by  the  great  rampart  of  the  Andes 
extending  from  the  southern  part  of  Chile  to  the  northwest 
of  America"  (p.  168).  It  has,  however,  been  known  for  a 
full  quarter  of  a  century  that  the  main  Andes  do  not  traverse 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  that  there  are  no  active  or  re- 
cently decayed  volcanoes  in  any  part  of  the  true  isthmus.  So 
far,  therefore,  as  danger  from  direct  volcanic  contacts  is  con- 
cerned, the  Panama  route  is  exempt.  The  case  is  very 
different  with  the  Nicaragua  route,  whose  line  is  laid  across 
the  almost  continuously  volcanic  tract  that  binds  Costa  Rica 
with  Salvador,  and  which  has  been,  during  the  period  of  the 
last  three-quarters  of  a  century,  probably  the  most  violently 
eruptive  of  any  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  On  the  line 
of  crustal  weakness  that  is  occupied  by  Lakes  Nicaragua  and 
Managua  there  are  distributed  over  a  linear  distance  of 


A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route.  7 

little  more  than  200  miles  not  less  than  25  volcanoes,  most 
of  which  have  been  active  within  a  very  modern  period  of 
time,  while  a  number  are  still  active  to-day.  A  few  actually 
lie  within  the  basin  of  Lake  Nicaragua  itself.  Coseguina, 
which  lies  only  60  miles  distant  from  the  line  of  the  initially- 
proposed  canal,  went  through  a  paroxysm  in  1835  which  has 
been  described  by  the  Geologist  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal 
Commission  as  "the  most  violent  recorded  eruption  until 
surpassed  by  that  of  Krakatoa  in  1883."  Yet,  in  the  face  of 
these  facts,  known  to  all  geographers  and  geologists,  the 
Isthmian  Canal  Commission  would  have  us  believe  that  so 
far  as  danger  from  this  source  is  concerned  the  two  routes 
stand  equal ! 

It  is  not  a  little  surprising  that  the  only  source  of  danger 
that  the  Commission  associates  with  volcanic  manifestations 
is  that  dependent  upon  the  secondary  phenomena  of  earth- 
quakes. The  individual  volcanic  catastrophe,  as  such,  does 
not  enter  for  consideration;  and  yet  it  is  only  fifteen  years 
ago  (1886)  that  the  great  Lake  of  Rotomahana,  in  New 
Zealand,  was  wrecked  and  emptied  of  its  water  through  the 
eruption  of  a  volcano  (Tarawera),  thought  to  have  been  ex- 
tinct for  upwards  of  a  hundred  years !  And  only  a  few  years 
earlier  (1879-80),  the  waters  of  Lake  Ilopango,  in  Salvador, 
had  been  lowered  35  feet  as  the  result  of  an  eruption  in  that 
body  of  water.  The  physiographic  conditions  of  Rotoma- 
hana previous  to  1886  could  have  been  precisely  paralleled 
with  those  now  existing  about  the  lake  region  of  Nicaragua. 

THE    CONDITIONS    OF    EARTHQUAKE    PHENOMENA. 

It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  the  conclusion  arrived  at 
by  the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission  regarding  the  dangers  to 


8  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

be  feared  from  earthquake  disturbances.  Were  the  subject 
not  so  important  a  one,  a  geologist  might  be  led  to  assume 
that  the  discussion  as  it  is  presented  was  not  intended  to  be 
treated  seriously.  We  are  told  that  in  general  terms  "the 
region  of  volcanoes  is  the  region  of  earthquakes,  but  the  im- 
mediate vicinity  of  the  volcanoes  is  not  necessarily  the  most 
dangerous  part  of  the  region" — a  statement  that  is  presum- 
ably intended  to  carry  with  it  the  inference  that  the  region  of 
Panama,  which  is  distantly  removed  from  volcanoes,  is  about 
as  likely  to  suffer  from  earthquake  disturbances  as  the  region 
of  Nicaragua,  which  is  in  close  proximity  to  or  in  direct  asso- 
ciation with  volcanoes !  The  basis  of  this  singular  conclusion 
appears  to  be  the  "doctrine,"  "accepted  by  such  writers  as 
Baron  Von  Humboldt,  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  Prof.  Charles 
Daubeny,  and  J.  Le  Conte,"  that  volcanoes  are  "safety  valves 
which  diminish  the  violence  of  earthquakes  in  their  vicinity" 
(p.  167)!  One  can  readily  admit  that  were  it  not  for  the 
presence  of  active  volcanoes  certain  earthquakes  in  particular 
regions  would  be  more  destructive  than  they  have  actually 
shown  themselves  to  be,  but  this  in  no  way  affects  the  general 
proposition  that  earthquakes  centre  about  the  volcanoes. 
While  it  is  perfectly  true  that  many  and  even  very  destructive 
earthquakes,  such  as  those  of  Lisbon,  in  1755,  and  Charles- 
ton, in  1886,  have  taken  place  in  absolutely  non-volcanic 
regions,  and  will  repeat  themselves  as  such  in  the  future,  it 
is  equally  true  that  every  region  of  marked  volcanic  activity, 
or  crustal  weakness,  is  one  distinguished  by  earth-movements 
and  dislocations.  The  Costa  Rican-Nicaraguan-Guatemalan 
region  is  one  preeminently  of  this  class,  and  one  need  have 
no  more  impressive  testimony  to  this  condition  than  the  de- 
struction, either  complete  or  in  large  part,  of  the  town  of 


A  Defence  of  the  Panama  Route.  g 

Cartago,  in  Costa  Rica,  four  times  in  the  course  of  the  past 
century  (1803,  1841,  1851,  1854),  the  destruction  ten  times 
of  San  Salvador  and  seven  times  of  the  city  of  Guatemala. 
The  town  of  Rivas,  at  the  precise  outlet  of  the  proposed 
Nicaragua  Canal  from  Lake  Nicaragua,  was  almost  com- 
pletely destroyed  by  the  earthquake  of  1844,  which  also 
wrecked  considerable  damage  to  Greytown,  the  inlet  to  the 
proposed  canal.  Mr.  E.  G.  Squier,  former  Charge  d' Affaires 
of  the  United  States  to  the  Republics  of  Central  America, 
describing  the  earthquake  of  1844,  states  that  the  waters  of 
Lake  Nicaragua  "were  observed  to  rise  and  fall  with  the 
throes  of  the  earth." 

It  is  well  known,  and  the  fact  is  admitted  in  the  report  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  Commission,  that  the  only  recorded 
earthquake  on  the  Panama  tract  "that  could  be  called  de- 
structive," in  a  period  of  over  three  centuries  (or  from  the 
time  of  the  Spanish  Conquest  to  the  year  1886),  was  the  earth- 
quake of  1621,  which  destroyed  the  greater  part  of  Panama. 
It  is,  therefore,  surpassing  strange,  with  these  convincing 
facts  before  it,  that  the  Commission  should  not  find  it  pos- 
sible "to  justify  a  comparison  between  the  Nicaragua  and 
Panama  routes  as  to  either  the  number  of  earthquakes  or 
their  severity"  (p.  168).  The  recent  shocks  reported  from 
Greytown  must  add  to  the  embarrassment  in  drawing  a  con- 
clusion. Were  the  volcanic  "safety-valves"  not  present,  it 
would,  perhaps,  be  easier  to  resolve  the  question ;  but,  then, 
it  might  pertinently  be  asked,  What  was  Vesuvius  doing 
during  the  great  Neapolitan  earthquake  of  1857?  What, 
again,  was  it  doing  in  1886,  when  the  city  of  Casamicciola, 
on  the  Island  of  Ischia,  was  wrecked,  or  what  was  the  function 
-of  Etna,  at  the  time  of  the  destruction  of  Catania,  in  1693? 


io  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

What  was  the  particular  aid  that  the  volcano  of  Irazu,  in 
Costa  Rica,  gave  to  the  town  of  Cartage,  lying  near  its  base, 
when  it  was  wrecked  in  the  years  1803,  1841,  1851,  and  1854 
— or  that  which  the  Volcan  de  Fuego  gave  to  the  ancient 
city  of  Guatemala?  These  instances  and  others  that  might 
be  cited  almost  without  number,  ought  to  be  sufficient  to 
convince  all  who  are  not  particularly  interested  in  canal  con- 
structions that  the  presence  of  an  active  volcano  is  no  safe- 
guard or  "mitigating  circumstance"  in  the  calculation  of 
earthquake  possibilities.  Its  presence,  on  the  contrary,  is  a 
warning  signal  forever,  for  the  conditions  that  brought  it 
into  existence  are  the  very  ones  that  make  earthquakes,  of 
one  class  at  least. 

THE  WATER  SUPPLY  OF  LAKE   NICARAGUA  INSUFFICIENT  FOR 
THE   NICARAGUA    CANAL. 

In  earlier  papers  on  the  water  supply  of  Lake  Nicaragua 
attention  is  called  to  the  surprising  fact,  developed  by  the 
investigations  of  the  Nicaraguan  and  Isthmian  Canal  Com- 
missions, that,  if  these  investigations  are  accurate  and  to  be 
relied  upon,  the  water  in  the  lake  must  be  a  continuously 
diminishing  one,  since  the  San  Juan  River  and  the  general 
evaporation  from  the  surface  of  the  lake  remove  more  than 
the  annual  rains  supply  to  the  lake  basin.  This  conclusion, 
pertinent  to  the  question  of  the  instability  and  steady  abase- 
ment of  the  lake  level,  and  its  effect  upon  a  canal  requiring 
a  permanent  summit  level,  has  been  warmly  dissented  from 
by  the  Geologist  and  Hydrographer  of  the  Commissions. 
In  its  present  report,  however,  by  accepting  the  impugned 
or  presumably  unreliable  data  of  rainfall  made  at  Rivas  and 
Masaya,  and  the  observations  on  evaporation  made  by  its 


A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route.  1 1 

Chief  Hydrographer,  the  Commission  virtually  assumes  the 
condition,  and  finds  it  necessary  to  throw  out  the  warning 
that  "no  wastage  whatever  would  be  permitted  during  such 
a  low-water  wet  season  as  that  of  1890.  The  rainfall  from  the 
entire  drainage  basin  would  be  impounded  in  the  lake,  and 
it  would  then  fall  short  of  restoring  the  depletion  resulting 
from  evaporation  and  requirements  of  the  canal"  (p.  146). 
As  a  result  of  the  operations  of  the  nineteen  months  of  that 
particular  season  (calculating  from  November,  1889,  to  June, 
1891),  the  Commission  says:  "In  other  words,  in  spite  of 
all  storage  of  available  water  during  the  nineteen  months, 
evaporation  from  the  lake  and  the  use  of  the  canal  have  run 
the  elevation  of  the  lake  surface  down  from  110.2  to  104 
(feet),  representing  the  net  depletion  of  6.2  feet  in  depth  of 
lake  water"  (p.  153). 

The  menace  to  a  permanent  canal  from  a  condition  of 
this  kind — the  loss  of  its  water — is  so  serious  that  only  the 
most  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  non-recurrence  in  suc- 
cessive periods  of  low  water  should  be  accepted  as  proving 
the  "recovery"  of  the  lake  in  the  alternate  wet  periods.  The 
Commission  appears  to  have  satisfied  itself  on  this  point,  for 
in  its  report  it  says:  "The  entire  record  for  fifteen  years, 
from  1886  to  1900,  at  Granada  and  Masaya,  shows  but  one 
year,  1890,  with  insufficient  precipitation  during  the  rainy 
season  to  fill  the  lake  and  restore  the  amount  evaporated" 
(p.  154).  This  conclusion  is  not  borne  out  by  the  data  that 
are  supplied  in  the  special  reports  of  the  Chief  Engineer  and 
the  Chief  Hydrographer.  It  is  shown,  for  example,  that 
between  the  months  of  November,  1893,  and  May,  i897/the 
total  rainfall  was  at  Rivas  192  inches  (and  at  Masaya  133 
inches),  which  according  to  the  formula  furnished  by  the 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Nicaragua  Canal  Commission,  would 


12  A  Defense  of  the  Panama  Route. 

have  raised  the  surface  of  the  lake,  were  there  no  outflow  and 
no  evaporation,  by  almost  exactly  200  inches.  The  evapo- 
ration during  the  same  period  of  three  and  a  half  years,  as 
computed  by  the  Chief  Hydrographer,  would  be  210  inches — 
a  loss  to  the  lake,  therefore,  of  10  inches,  allowing  not  a  par- 
ticle of  overflow  with  which  to  supply  the  canalized  river,  and 
not  permitting  a  drop  of  wastage  of  any  kind. 

Precisely  the  same  condition  presented  itself  in  the  inter- 
val from  November,  1882,  to  May,  1886,  and  our  knowledge 
is  much  too  imperfect  to  permit  us  to  say  with  any  degree 
of  positiveness  that  much  more  unfavorable  conditions  may 
not  present  themselves  in  the  future. 

The  facts  in  our  possession,  then,  manifestly,  do  not 
justify  the  conclusion  of  the  Commission  that  the  "lake 
affords  an  inexhaustible  water  supply  for  the  canal"  by  the 
Nicaragua  route  (p.  257).  They  show  plainly  the  reverse : 
that  the  supply  is  insufficient,  and  that  no  amount  of  storage 
or  raising  to  high  level  compatible  with  the  security  of  the 
construction  and  general  convenience  can  give  sufficient 
margin  of  "retained"  water  to  insure  a  serviceable  canal. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  broad  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  all  the 
premises  are : — 

1.  Commercially,  the  true  trans-isthmian  route  is  that  of 
the  contemplated  Panama  Canal. 

2.  Constructionally, — as  involving  less  engineering  diffi- 
culties, avoiding  the  superior  risks  from  earthquake  and  vol- 
canic disturbances  and  water  shortages,  and  presenting  a  far 
more  acceptable  course  for  steaming, — the  Panama  Canal,  of 
the  two  canals  under  general  discussion,  alone  merits  serious 
consideration. 


YOFC-      *£^ 


